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 4 
SUMMARY 
 
The thesis is an attempt to analyse the concept of limitation of liability for maritime 
claims with multiple legal and policy perspectives. In trying to analyse the issues 
related to limitation of liability, the thesis explores the historical background to the 
development of the concept of limitation of liability within both civil and common 
law. 
 
A synoptic overview on the development of international conventions pertaining to 
maritime claims has been presented. One particular issue that is highlighted is the 
recent development of the case law on the conduct barring limitation provision in the 
convention which may to some extent show the policy consideration behind the legal 
reasoning from a common law perspective. Further, the discussion encompasses a 
brief examination of the legal effects of International Safety Mechanism in particular, 
the role of designated person, concerning alter ego concept pertaining to rule of 
attribution within a corporate structure.  
 
In addition, an introduction to the economic analysis of law has been presented in 
order to show how liability concept is examined by this discipline and in what ways 
such study contribute to the discussion of the effect of limitation of liability within the 
context of the thesis. The emphasis has been on the examination of justifications of 
proponents and antagonists on the limitation of liability for maritime claims.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The right of global limitation of liability was conceived to serve the needs of 
commerce and in the maritime field to encourage investment in the shipping industry. 
Although the concept of limitation evolved to this day, antagonists
1
  believe that in a 
modern era, the limitation of liability for shipowner is outdated and should be 
abolished citing its absence of justification that prevailed long ago. Shipowner's 
limitation of liability has been described as an outdated principle “which should be 
relegated to the era of wooden hulls”.2 In contrast, others believe that it is a balancing 
and thriving factor in international trade, shipping and insurance sectors. At the time 
of the inception of doctrine within the milieu of maritime law, the policy makers or 
judges did not forecast the advancement of technology relating to shipping, or the 
increase of the receiving parties to the limitation, and the fact that insurance 
development plays such a considerable impact on the shipping industry in particular 
concerning liability cover.  
 
Further, the effect of maritime activities on the environmental was also ignored to the 
extent that for instance in the Torrey Canyon oil spill of 1967, the liability of the 
shipowner was held to be USD 50, while the clean-up cost to the governments of the 
United Kingdom and France was USD 18 million.
3
 The issue of limitation of liability 
has been scrutinised in great deal but the enquiry still continue on the validity of its 
prolonged presence in the maritime legal and commercial field. The question remains 
whether it is still a necessity for the shipping, transportation and insurance industries 
                                                             
1Gotthard Gauci, ‘Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law, an anachronism?’ Marine Policy, vol. 19, 
no. 1, (1995) pp. 65-74. 
2
 Edward T. Hayes, ‘In The wake of the M/V Bright Fields, A Call for Abandoning The Shipowner’s 
Limitation of Liability Act’, Loyola Law Review, Vol. 44, (1998), p.135. 
3
Billah Muhammad Masum, ‘Economic Analysis of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability’, U.S.F. 
Maritime Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2006-7), p. 299. 
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and whether this legal heritage, incentive, privilege or concession should be retained 
in light of modern development of communication, transport, and insurance 
industries. The liability spectrum in maritime field has been developed from Torrey 
Canyon to OPA 1990
4
, one was being the weakest point of the limitation and the latter 
the extreme form of unlimited liability. 
 
 
1.1 Purpose and Composition 
 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine and analyse limitation of liability for maritime 
claims in light of the recent advancement in communication and shipping related 
technology as well as legal development in this field. This issue will be analysed in 
two different parts namely, policy and legal consideration with a multiple 
perspectives.  
 
One particular issue that will be highlighted is the recent development of the case law 
on the conduct barring limitation clause in the convention which may to some extent 
show the policy consideration behind the legal reasoning. On the other hand through 
judicial decisions, and more importantly, national legislation, there are tendencies to 
restrict that limitation with the strict liability mechanism such as the USA‘s Oil 
Pollution Act (OPA) 1990.  
 
 
 The main research questions set out to answer and cover the topic are inter alia; 
1. What are the factors and justifications supporting the limitation of liability for 
different parties in maritime transportation? 
2. Is Limitation of Liability a privilege or right? 
                                                             
4
 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, (33 U.S.C. 2701). 
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3. How various international conventions, legislation, case law jurisprudence has 
interpreted the concept of limitation of liability? 
4. What are the effects of OPA as an example for global limitation of liability? 
5. Is the conduct barring clause a balancing factor for limitation of liability for 
maritime claims? Is the test a tendency toward criminalisation in the limitation of 
liability field?  
6. Is limitation of liability an anachronism in the modern era? 
 
 
1.2 Research and Material 
 
 
 In writing the thesis the author will adapt the legal dogmatic approach in analysing 
various international conventions relating to limitation of liability in particular for 
maritime claims, publication of international organisation such as IMO, judicial 
decisions, case law in the United Kingdom and United States. Further, secondary 
resources such as books, peers reviewed articles and reports will be used. The 
justification for the policy part including sectoral expectation and historical 
background will be discussed to illustrate the development of the international 
conventions and legal doctrines. To some extent, the thesis will take a comparative 
study in the historical background to the establishment and development of the 
concept of limitation of liability. 
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Chapter 2 
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
 
 
The basic principle of shipowners’ limitation of liability is to hold the shipowner 
liable in principle but to reduce this liability by limiting his total exposure.
5
 Limitation 
permits a shipowner, whether with respect to liability arising from collision, allision
6
, 
grounding, cargo damage, death or personal injuries, to claim a limit upon his 
damages.
7
 Historically, limitation of liability was considered a privilege because the 
concept was an exception to, or a variation of, the general rule of law that a successful 
claimant was entitled to be recompensed by the wrongdoer for the full amount of the 
loss, damage or injury suffered by him.
8
  
 
2.1 The Origin of the Concept of Limitation of Liability 
 
Limitation of liability is closely linked to the Roman law notion of noxae deditio
9
, in 
terms of which an owner could discharge liability for damage to another individual by 
giving up the offending instrument.
10
 It should be noted that some writers believe that 
such theory in linking the notion of limitation to the Roman law is not unanimously 
                                                             
5 Alex Rein, ‘International Variations on Concepts of Limitation of Liability’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 
53, (1979), p. 1256. 
6
 Allision, Maritime Law, The contact of a vessel with a stationary object such as an anchored vessel or 
a pier. Bryan A. Garner, Black‘s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition (West, Thomson Reuters, 2009), p. 88. 
7
 William Tetley, ‘Shipowners' Limitation of Liability and Conflicts of Law: The Properly Applicable 
Law’, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 23, No. 4, October, (1992), p. 558. 
8
 Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, World Maritime University Publications, 2002, Page 
197. 
9
 James J. Donovan, ‘The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability’, 53 Tulane 
Law Review, (1978-1979), p. 1000, “Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his treatise The Common Law, traced 
the doctrine which made the ship not only the source but the limit of liability, to the Roman legal 
principle of “noxae deditio”. 
10
 Gauci, supra note 1, p. 65. 
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well received by scholars. In any event, there is little reason to believe that a Roman 
maritime code, if one existed, contained any provision for shipowners’ limitation of 
liability.
11
 Such observation is well-founded, but most scholars do not regard it as the 
provision for the shipowners’ limitation, but a projection of the notion of the 
limitation of liability doctrine. 
 The contrat de commande, which seems to be the base of the limitation of liability in 
mercantile matters, originated before the twelfth century. Under this method the party 
who had advanced the goods or funds was not personally liable for contracts.
12
 
Accordingly, a merchant was responsible to the extent of his share of goods or fund 
which were intrusted to another party, or was invested in someone else trading 
venture. In this context, the logical reason is the fact that those who invested had not 
been directly engaged in the adventure.  
 
It appears that the Tablets of Amalfi is the earliest extant evidence of the shipowner’s 
right to limit his liability. The commercial code was written for the Republic of 
Amphilia (Italy) in about eleventh century. Later, the code of Valencia and its 
contemporary, the Consolato Del Mare of Barcelona, were compiled under the 
direction of Peter IV of Aragon.
13
 Under the terms of the Consolato Del Mare, owners 
and part owners’ liability was limited only to the extent of their respective share in the 
ship itself for debts incurred by the master in obtaining ship’s necessaries or for cargo 
damage arising from improper loading or from unseaworthiness.
14
 Limitation in this 
period is defined or interpreted to the extent that the burden and expenses related to 
the master’s ship’s necessaries and possible cargo damage was shared in accordance 
with the various parties share of investment in that particular maritime adventure. 
                                                             
11
  Donovan, supra note 9, p.1000. 
12
 Oya Z.  Özçayair, Liability for Oil Pollution and Collision (Lloyd’s of London Press, 1998), p.299. 
13
  Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1001. 
14
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 300. 
 12 
Thus, in doing so, the responsibility of the shipowner and the master was limited to 
the extent of their investment.
15
   
 
Following commercial revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the 
privilege of shipowner’s liability was adapted in almost all the continental maritime 
jurisdictions such as the Atlantic coast trading communities, the North Sea and the 
Baltic communities.
16
 The early examples of the statute concerning limitation of 
liability in Europe are inter alia; the Statutes of Hamburg of 1603, the Hanseatic 
Ordinance of 1614 (and 1644), the Maritime Codes of Charles II of Sweden (1667) 
and 1721 Ordinance of Rotterdam. According to these statutes, the liability of a 
shipowner was limited to the value of his vessel. The important element of the 
concept of limitation was that the proceeds of the value of the ship were to satisfy the 
claimants. Additionally it is submitted that under those mentioned statutes, shipowner 
enjoyed two options, one to compensate the full value of the ship or to abandon his 
vessel. The interesting characteristic of such process is that the ship-owners other 
property or asset was protected unless agreed by contractual arrangement.
17
  
 
Limitation of liability as a rule in maritime law was probably first codified at the time 
of Louis XIV in the seventeen century
18
  where it is declared that “the owners of ships 
shall be answerable for the deeds of the master, but shall be discharged, abandoning 
their ship and freight”.19 The Ordinance of Rotterdam promulgated in 1721 declared 
                                                             
15
 Duggu Damar, Wilful Misconduct in International Transport Law (Springer, 2011), p. 9. Donavan, 
supra note 9, p. 1001, see also; Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 300. 
16
 D.R. Owen, ‘The origins and Development of Marine Collision Law’, 51 Tulane Law Review,(1979), 
p. 760, see also; Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 300, Donovan, supra note 13, p. 1002. 
17
  Donovan, supra note, 9, p. 1003. 
18
 The Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV was first codification and was compiled under the direction of 
Minister Colbert in 1681. 
19
 Graydon S. Staring, ‘The Roots and False Aspersions of Shipowner's Limitation of Liability’, 
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, vol. 39, No. 3, (2008), p.323. 
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that “the owners shall not be answerable for any act the master has done without their 
order, any further than their part of the ship amounts to”.20  
 
The great Dutch publicist and legal scholar, Hugo Grotius promoted it as a matter of 
public policy.
21
 The Marine Ordinance of Louis XIV (1681)
22
 was incorporated into 
the French Code de Commerce of 1807 (the Code Napoleon). As a result of these 
incorporations it formed part of the maritime law of several European and Latin 
American countries.
23
 From the same era comes the Rhodian Law of Jettison, adopted 
in Roman law and now developed as general average, in which vessel and cargo and 
freight are partnered under the authority of the master.
24
 Although both these concepts 
are considered separate, they share some characteristics which served the purpose of 
filling the vacuum of insurance in the past and playing the same role partially taking 
into account the insurance perspective. 
 
Historical background shows the origin and development of the concept of limitation 
of liability from its inception to the modern day. It shows that at the time when there 
was not insurance in modern day term, the concept was somehow a mechanism for 
sharing the loss by different participants. It can be safely deduced from such study 
that the sharing of loss of the adventure and assets were to ensure that the risks are 
partial for the shipowner and business participants, reducing the loss of the shipowner, 
master and the crew.  
 
The parties in the maritime adventure were of course limited at the time, and as it can 
be seen later in the judicial interpretation of limitation of liability section of this 
                                                             
20
  Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1003. 
21
 Edgar Gold, et al., Maritime Law, (Irwin law, 2003), p. 718. 
22
 Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV. 
23
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 300.  
24
  Staring, supra note 19, p. 321. 
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thesis, the inception of the corporation made this part of the development more 
complex in particular to the liability concept of the maritime adventure. Based on the 
historical study, the primary characteristics of the liability was that the shipowner’s 
liability was limited to the value of his vessel in that particular adventure merely for 
the reason that that ship was the instrument of the loss, or according to the modern 
day concept, it was considered as an insurance for the liability related to such 
particular loss. Later with codification of the concept of limitation in Europe, the 
shipowner’s other vessels or properties were spared in the assessment of his liability.   
 
Under the first developed systems of the maritime community practically all 
liabilities, contractual or non-contractual, were subject to limitation as long as they 
arose during the maritime adventure. The only exception to this rule was where they 
were sustained through a personal act of the shipowner.
25
  All the systems which were 
developed in the seventh century, including the French and German systems
26
 had 
some similarities such as recognising the voyage as the limitation unit and liabilities 
subject to limitation were those that might arise during such particular venture. The 
surrendering assets of the shipowner were the ship, its appurtenances and the freight 
earned in the venture.
27
 In the civil law, there were two theories of limitation; 
abandonment, which is associated with France, and execution, applied in Germany 
and Scandinavia.
28
  
By virtue of abandonment, a shipowner, while personally liable, was able to absolve 
himself of all claims by relinquishing his ship as well as any pending freight.
29
 At this 
time, England and the United States were not interested in adapting similar statutes or 
acts that the Europeans pioneered, but recognised it as general principles of maritime 
                                                             
25
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 301. 
26
 The abandonment system originated in the Romanish countries of Southern Europe and developed in 
France, and the maritime lien system was developed in the Germanic countries of Northern Europe and 
was perfected in Germany, so it was called the German system.( Özçayair , Page 301, Para 3). 
27
 Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 301. 
28
 Tetley, supra note 7, p. 587. 
29
  Tetley, supra note 7, p 587. 
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law. Finally, limitation of liability for maritime claims reached England in the 
eighteenth century and the USA in the nineteenth century.
30
  
 
Apart from legal considerations in protecting shipping interests and subsequent policy 
tendencies to encourage shipping, the spread of statutory limitation in this period has 
been attributed to the growth of trade and its capital demands, and changes in the 
business relationships of owners and masters, as well as the risks of sea adventures 
and the inability of owners to control the fortunes they sent on sea voyages.
31
  
 
As mentioned above while various limitation of liability regimes were sanctioned in 
Europe and South American countries, the inception of English and American 
Limitation of liability is notable, since one of the considerable justifications for the 
enactment of the limitation of liability by Parliament in England was the disadvantage 
of the British trade interests in comparison with their continental and international 
rivals. In particular the English concept of the doctrine, as we shall see, and the effects 
of the English on conventional limitation of liability are interesting as they are 
considered as late comers in the development of the international maritime limitation 
of liability convention but the effect of its statutory limitation on the American 
Limitation of liability and the 1957 convention is notable. The common law concept 
of limitation of liability will be discussed in the following section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30
  Damar, supra note 15, p. 9, see also; Donovan, supra note 9, p.1009. 
31
  Staring, supra note 19, p.323. 
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2.2 Common Law Concept of Limitation of Liability 
 
Traditionally, English admiralty law traces its origin to the Rules of Oleron
32
   which 
contain no mention of limitation of a shipowner’s liability to his investment in his 
vessel.
33
 They were included in the Black Book of Admiralty, a reference book used 
in the English admiralty courts, where they were considered dispositive.
34
 English 
maritime interests were therefore burdened by the common law doctrines of insurer 
liability of common carriers
35
 and respondant superior.
36
 So before enactment of the 
statute on the Responsibility of the Shipowners’Act, shipowners were considered as 
common carriers and therefore if they failed to observe due care and diligence for the 
cargo, the liability was in the form of strict liability.
37
 That meant that the shipowner 
would have assumed the sole responsibility as the carrier and insurer.
38
  
In addition, the common carrier principle was an implied obligation distinct from the 
express contractual arrangement.
39
 The inception of the first English statute of 
limitation of liability for shipowners is connected to the case of Boucher v. Lawson
40
, 
where a ship owner was liable for the loss of cargo of gold bullion which was stolen 
by the master. Since there was no limitation of liability similar to other European 
countries, the shipowner was found personally liable to the full value of the cargo. 
The rationale for limitation of liability in this period was to protect the innocent owner 
                                                             
32
  Circa 1150 A.D.   
33
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1005. 
34
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1006. 
35
 Common carriers are those who are willing to carry goods of any person who could pay their charges 
as long as there is enough space available. See; Oya Z. Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 305, Para 2. 
36
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1007. 
37
 For Instance see cases of  Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Raym 909 and Forward v. Pittard (1785) 1 
T.R.27 in Özçayair, supra, note, 12,PP. 305-306. 
38
 Oya z. Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 305, Para 2. 
39
 Ibid, p. 305, Para 3. 
40
 (1733) Cas. T. hard 53; 95 E. R. 116. 
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from unlimited liability for negligence of those particular servants who were beyond 
his physical control.
41
 The outcome of the case promoted a petition to the Parliament 
by the shipowners and merchants “that, unless some provision is made for their relief, 
trade and navigation will be greatly discouraged, since owners of ships find 
themselves . . . exposed to ruin”.42  
 
Thus the preamble of The Responsibilities of Shipowners Act 1733 clearly states the 
reasons and justifications for the Act (which is also a direct respond to the 
shipowners’ petition) as the following: 
 
It is of greatest consequences and importance to this kingdom, to promote the 
increase of the number of ships and vessels, and to prevent any 
discouragement to merchants and others from being concerned therein….. 
[Failing to do so] will necessarily tend to the prejudice of the trade and 
navigation of this kingdom.
43
 
 
The effect of the Act and its intended interpretation was to limit the shipowners 
liability for those acts of the master or crew that had been done without the “privity or 
knowledge” of the owner that resulted in causing loss or damage to cargo. The 1733 
Act had the effect of limiting a shipowner’s liability for loss of cargo by theft by 
master and the crew.
44
 The extent of the limitation was the value of the ship, its 
equipment, and the freight which was to be earned on that particular voyage.
45
  The 
1733 Act was considered to be an innovative development, since there has not been 
any evidence of its existence in other European statutes, which were mentioned  
                                                             
41
 Kenneth E. Roberts, ‘For Retention of Limitation of Liability for Shipowners’, American Bar 
Association. Sec. Ins. Negl. & Comp. L. Proc. (1968), p. 421. 
42
 Donovan, supra note 9, p.1007. 
43  Nigel Messon, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice, 3rd Edition, (Informa Business Publishing, 
2003), p. 107. 
44
 Christopher Hill, Maritime Law, 6th Edition, (Lloyd’s of London Press, 2003), p. 394. 
45
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1007. 
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earlier, such as the Roles d’ Oleron, which is considered as the instrument from which 
the English shipowners drew their inspiration. 
46
 
 
Another development by Parliament in enacting a new statute, again, emanated from 
“forced robbery” on board a vessel in the Thames in 1784. Here the term 
“embezzlement” in the previous statute promoted enquiries as to whether the term 
covered “forced robbery” which would have protected shipowners if the answer was 
affirmative. Since the outcome was not to the satisfaction of the shipowners, there 
was yet another petition to the Parliament for more protection for the shipowners 
which resulted in the new Act of 1786.
47
 Consequently, the right to limit was 
extended to include any act by the master or crew occurring without the privity of the 
shipowner.
48
 
 
In 1813 another act concerning the liability of shipowners was passed. The act 
provided for shipowners’ limitation of liability for damages which arose as a result of 
negligence, and expressly provided for limitation in the event of collision.
49
But it was 
by virtue of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 that limitation has underwent a major 
change to a different standard by which limitation was to be calculated by reference to 
a ship’s tonnage rather than the value of the ship which was intended to reach a more 
certain basis than the more uncertain value of ship and freight alternative.
50
  The 1894 
Act was the most comprehensive legislation of the times according to which the 
concept of limitation of liability was extended to collision liability thereby fortifying a 
maritime rule of unlimited liability that prevailed in all other areas of the law.
51
 
                                                             
46
  Proshanto K. Mukherjee, ‘Essentials of the regimes of limitation of liability in Maritime law’, 
Admiral IV, (Lund University, 2012), p. 40. 
47
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1008. 
48
  Patrick Griggs, et al., Limitation for Maritime Claims, (Informa Law, 2005), p. 4. 
49
  Mukherjee, supra note 8, p. 40. 
50
  Hill, supra note 43, p. 394. 
51
  Mukherjee, supra note 45, p. 44. 
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Today, provisions of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
1976, which was originally enacted into English law by the Merchant Shipping Act 
1979,  is now to be found in Schedule 7 to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.
52
  
 
Under the British system limitation could be invoked only with respect to claims 
arising out of wrongful acts committed by the owner’s servants in the course of their 
service to the ship. That is a reference to the concept of “actual fault and privity” in 
the British system.  Limitation unit was any distinct occasion or occurrences giving 
rise to liability”.53 The expression “distinct occasion” is very important, as it will 
determine the circumstances in which the aggregated limit is to apply, in particular in 
a complex marine casualty since there may be doubt as to what amounts to a distinct 
occasion or on a separate occasion, where the claims are the result of the same act of 
negligence.
54
   
A clear example for the expression “distinct occasion” is that, if in a particular 
voyage, there is a collision at the beginning and another at the end, the court will most 
likely consider each one as one “distinct occasion” and accordingly there would be a 
separate limitation Fund for each occasion.
55
 For instance in the case of the Rajah
56
, 
where a ship struck a tug and also a tow,  it was held that since one act of negligence 
caused the casualty,  it is regarded as one distinct occasion, therefore one limitation 
fund should be constituted.
57
 
 
Under the English statute, the extent of the owner's liability was calculated on the 
value of the vessel immediately prior to the incident, rather than on the continental 
                                                             
52
  Messon, supra note 42, p. 107. 
53
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 303. 
54
  Michael White, Australian Maritime Law, 2
nd
 edition, (Federation Press, 2000), p. 323. 
55
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 368. 
56
 [1872] L.R. 3A.&E. 539. 
57
 See also case of The Shawn [1892] P.419 in Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 368. 
 20 
post-accident formula.
58
  In the international shipping community, there are many 
systems for limitation and differences between these systems cause conflicts on the 
choice of law.
59
  
 
2.3 United States’ Limitation of Liability 
 
The privilege of limitation of shipowners’ liability made its first statutory appearance 
in the United States, in the states of Massachusetts (1819) and Maine (1821). The 
Massachusetts Act was, surprisingly, modelled on the 1734 English statute, not the 
more recent enactment of 1813.
60
  
The American Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability Act was passed in 1851 and 
modelled on the first English Act of 1734.
61
   Until the introduction of the act the 
shipowner’s liability was not limited. The Act was mainly based on the abandonment 
system, originated from the French system, meaning that the limitation amount 
depends on the status of the vessel after casualty, and that what is left of the vessel in 
term of value would have been abandoned to the creditor or claimants.  According to 
this system the owner could dissociate himself of further liability by transferring his 
interest in the vessel and freight to a court-appointed trustee. According to such 
system the limitation unit is the voyage.
62
  
 
It is submitted that the only major amendment to the 1851 Act was in 1936.  The 
amendment was to provide a fund based on tonnage, later increased, for personal 
injuries and deaths where the abandoned amount is insufficient. The only tonnage 
limitation known in the United States is the limitation of USD 420 per ton in the event 
                                                             
58
 Donovan, supra note 9, p. 1008. 
59
 Özçayair, supra note 12, p.302. 
60
 Donovan, supra note 12, p. 1009. 
61
 Staring, supra note 19, p. 316. 
62
  Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 302. 
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of personal injury and death claims. This limitation dates from 1935, when it was first 
established at USD 60 per ton, and raised to its present level in 1984.
63
  
 
 It has long been widely recognized that the Act is outmoded and should be 
superseded by one based on tonnage of the vessel, which would provide the same 
fund regardless of the vessel’s survival, such as the International Convention now in 
force in other major maritime nations.
64
 The American limitation of liability has been 
criticised on two front, first, the need for an upgrade and the second, abolishing the 
concept of limitation of liability altogether. Such submission is supported by 
statement of Judge Kozinski in the American case of Esta Lataer Charters, Inc v 
Ignacio
65
 where in reference to limitation of liability , he indicated that “misshapen 
from the start, the subject of later incrustations, arthritic with age, ….this is an area 
that could profit from modern legislative attention… congress might be well advised 
to examine other approaches or to consider whether the rationale underlying the 
liability Act continues to have vitality as we enter the last decade of the twentieth 
century”.66  
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Chapter 3 
OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS 
 
3.1 International Convention on Limitation of Liability 1924 
 
 
In line with national development of limitation of liability for maritime related 
activities and “in order to strengthen the international competitiveness of national 
merchant fleets, efforts were made by means of global limitation of liability to attract 
people to invest in the branch so to build up a competitive merchant marine”.67 It has 
been submitted that the first effort for uniformity of the limitation regimes was in 
1908, by the Comite Maritime International (CMI), which was based on the existing 
systems at the time and modelled on the Belgian system which embraced a 
compromised mixture of all available limitation of liability regimes. According to 
which shipowner had three choices; he could abandon the ship and freight as in the 
French system, or surrender the value of the ship and freight at the end of the voyage 
as in the American system, and the last choice was similar to the British system which 
the shipowner had to pay 200 francs per tonne for the satisfaction of all the claims, 
property and personal, relating to the voyage.
68
 CMI continued its quest for 
uniformity by introduction of the 1924 Convention which had 13 parties, mainly from 
Europe, but did not garner much support.
69
Based on the 1924 Convention, 
70
the 
limitation unit is the accident and the limitation fund is constituted on the basis of the 
value of the ship after the accident plus 10 per cent of its value at the commencement 
of the voyage.
71
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3.2 International Convention relating to the Limitation of 
Liability 1957  
 
As the 1924 convention failed to gain support, Comite Maritime International (CMI)’ 
initiated yet another effort for uniformity which resulted in the 1957
72
 convention on 
limitation of liability.  The 1957 Convention gathered 50 parties, the bulk of the 
world’s principal shipping nations except that of the United States, Greece and 
Russia. That convention still remains in force for a few. Its successor of 1976 is “the 
last effort to create uniformity on the global limitation”73 which garnered 50 parties, 
and the Protocol of 1996 further raising values was ratified by 23 of them.
74
 At 
present, even though there are several jurisdiction who still subscribe to the 1957 
regime, it is the LLMC 1976 modified by its Protocol of 1996 that represents the 
international convention law on global limitation of liability.
75
  
 
The 1957 Convention is a revised version of the British tonnage system. Under the 
convention limitation is restricted to liability for damage or infringement of rights and 
wreck removal. The limitation is again the “distinct occasion” and the fund is set up 
exclusively on the tonnage of the ship. In order to find a compromise both to states 
that wanted a higher limit and those that did not, the measure based on the average 
value of British ships was reinstated. USA and Russia have not ratified the 
convention.
76
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3.3 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) 1976 
 
 
The International Conference on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims took 
place in London between 1 and 19 November 1976 under the auspices of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
77
 The reason for a new convention was 
that the rules relating to the limitation of liability for maritime claims in the 1957 
Limitation Conventions required changes to embrace an increase in the limitation 
figures due to the problem of inflation. The problem of inflation regarding the 
compensation figures in the 1957 promoted the desire to create a mechanism to deal 
with such a problem. The effect of depreciation in monetary values was that the 
limitation amount had become practically low. On the other hand, the size of the ships 
had increased due to technological advancement and economic preferences. There 
was a need to accommodate new categories of operators to be included in the 
convention such as salvage.  Article one of the Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims 1976 (hereafter 1976 Convention) provides a right to ship 
owners and salvors to limit their liability for claims that is provided in Article two  of 
the same Convention.  According to Article 1(2), the term shipowner is defined as 
“the owner, charterer, manager and operator of a seagoing ship”. Article 2 of the 
LLMC 1976 sets out the claims as follows:  
 
(a) claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss or damage to 
property (including damage to harbour works, basins and waterways and 
aids to navigation), occurring on board or in direct connexion with the 
operation of the ship or with salvage operations, and consequential loss 
resulting there from; 
 
(b) claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in the carriage by sea of 
cargo, passengers or their luggage; 
 
                                                             
77
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(c) claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of rights other 
than contractual rights, occurring in direct connexion with the operation of 
the ship or salvage operations; 
 
(d) claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or the rendering 
harmless of a ship which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, 
including anything that is or has been on board such ship; 
 
(e) claims in respect of the removal, destruction or the rendering harmless of 
the cargo of the ship; 
 
(f) Claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of measures taken 
in order to avert or minimise loss for which the person liable may limit his 
liability in accordance with this Convention, and further loss caused by such 
measures. 
 
Article 1(3) of the LLMC 1976 states that salvor includes “any person rendering 
services in direct connection with salvage operations”. The inclusion of the above 
provision in the LLMC 1976 fills the gap in the 1957 Convention that was revealed in 
The Tojo Maru case.
78
 In that case, the salvor was unable to limit in respect of a claim 
arising out of the negligence of one of its divers, brought against it by the owners of 
the salved vessel.
79
 On the other hand the inclusion of the salvors to the class of 
persons, who can limit their liability, is emanated from the dissatisfaction of the 
salvage industry and the international maritime community with the decision of the 
House of Lords in the Tojo Maru case.
80
 Therefore protection of those new categories 
of operators was a factor which promoted the need for a new convention.
81
  
 
The need for revision became more urgent as a result of the 1969 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which was in some respect inconsistent with the 
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1957 Convention.
82
 It was recognised that the previous system of limitation had given 
rise to too much litigation that needed to be evaded in the future.
83
 It is submitted that 
the conference had to consider the competing interest of the shipowners in retaining 
the right to limit their liability and consequently being able to insure such liability at a 
reasonable premium. In doing so, the interest of the insurers has also been taking into 
consideration that is closely related to the shipowners demand for insurance cover. 
 
 On the other hand, with the increase of the compensation figures and establishment 
of a limitation fund, a successful claimant will be ensured of a reasonable 
compensation for his loss or injury. It was agreed that the limitation fund should be at 
a level that the shipowners could protect themselves by reasonable insurance cover at 
a reasonable premium. Finally, the creation of an unbreakable term enshrined in 
Article 4 of the convention was considered as a move to balance the competing 
interests of various parties at the conference on the limitation of liability for maritime 
claims.
84
 Article 4 of the 1976 Convention, is regarded as a major change in 
comparison to the 1957 convention which states that “a person shall not be entitled to 
limit its liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission 
with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss 
would probably result”.85 Article 4 of the LLMC 1976 will be discussed in details in 
the ‘Conduct Barring Limitation’ chapter. 
 
Although the amount of compensation were increased previously, as explained above, 
pursuant to the LLMC Protocol of 1996, in a new development, the limitation amount 
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were increased by amendments
86
 that were adopted on 19 April 2012 which will enter 
into force on 8 June 2015, by the Legal Committee of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), when the Committee met for its 99th session in London. The 
LLMC Convention sets specified limits of liability for two types of claims against 
shipowners namely claims for loss of life or personal injury, and property claims such 
as damage to other ships, property or harbour works.
87
 The main reasons for the 
amendments were inadequacy of compensation to cover the claims, in particular 
claims arising from incident involving bunker fuel spills.
88
 
 
3.4 International Bunkers Convention 2001  
 
The reasons for adaptation of the Bunkers Convention
89
 were stated by IMO as “to 
ensure that adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is available to persons who 
suffer damage caused by spills of oil, when carried as fuel in ships’ bunkers”.90  The 
Bunker convention is modelled on the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969.  
The bunker Convention is applicable for vessels of more than 1000 gross tonnage. 
The key requirements of the Convention are respectively, compulsory insurance cover 
by the registered owner and a mechanism of direct action against insurers. Although 
the bunker Convention is a standalone instrument but it is submitted that its limits of 
liability is tied to the limits contained in the LLMC 1996 Protocol. The Bunkers 
Convention has been adapted to fill a gap in the CLC regime that the application of 
which is, with some exception, limited to pollution damage emanating from laden 
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tankers.
91
 At a practical level such statement means that the bunker pollution from 
non-tankers remained uncovered as it is not covered by the CLC Convention.  
However, it is submitted that in most instances, the damage caused by bunker fuel 
pollution exceeded the limits of compensation available under the applicable LLMC 
1976 or national regimes.
92
  
As mentioned above the limitation of liability for bunkers Convention is connected to 
the LLMC 1976, but it has been noted that pollution damage does not fall under the 
claims mentioned in Article 2 of the LLMC 1976. It is for this reason that there are 
uncertainties as to whether the shipowner can limit his liability under the Bunkers 
Convention without governmental interference for its effective implementation. In 
reference to the Article 6
93
 of Bunker Convention, it has been observed that the 
provision stated in Article 6 of the Convention is not in harmony with the application 
of international regime, since the issue of shipowner’s liability will be determined by 
the law of the State where bunker related pollution occurred, meaning that a conflict 
of laws is triggered since States have different rule on this subject.
94
 Therefore it has 
been suggested that the State parties must make sure that the shipowner has a right to 
limitation regarding bunkers Convention through their respective national law by way 
of interpretation after ratifying the LLMC 1996 Protocol. Consequently, if such 
measures are taking into consideration and acted upon, then such actions will provide 
international uniformity.
95
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3.5 Civil Liability Convention 1992  
 
 
Civil Liability Convention 1992, as a specific convention regime, is considered to be 
the equivalent of the OPA 1990, as both created to deal with similar subject matter, 
namely oil pollution, but with different approaches regarding liability and 
compensation mechanism. On the other hand, OPA has become a standard for 
comparison regarding its effectiveness, extent of compensation and in particular 
limitation of liability. The Civil Liability Convention was adopted to ensure that 
adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil pollution damage 
resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships.  
 
However, the other main reason for adaptation of such mechanism is to provide 
uniform rules regarding procedures and liability.
96
 Article II of the CLC Convention, 
sets the application of the convention to “pollution damage” and “preventive 
measures” in a geographical zone which embraces the territorial zone and exclusive 
economic zone
97
of the contracting States. The Convention applies to all seagoing 
vessels actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo, but only ships carrying more than 2,000 
tons of oil are required to maintain insurance in respect of oil pollution damage.
98
 
According to Article I(5) of the convention, “oil” means any persistent hydrocarbon 
mineral oil, such  as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether 
carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship. Article I (6) refers to 
“pollution damage” as follows: 
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(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from 
the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the 
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be 
limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually 
undertaken or to be undertaken; 
 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.  
 
The channelling of liability for pollution damage, by the Convention, is rooted to the 
registered owner of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped or was discharged.   
However, except where the owner has been guilty of actual fault, they may limit 
liability in respect of any one incident. Shipowners are normally entitled to limit their 
liability to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of the ship.
99
  
 
 Subject to a number of specific exceptions, 
100
the Convention stipulates the principle 
of strict liability for shipowners and creates a system of compulsory liability 
insurance. Article VII of the Convention requires ships covered by it to maintain 
insurance or other financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank or a certificate in 
sums equivalent to the owner’s total liability for one incident.  The above mentioned 
exception includes act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or “a natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character”, 101  act or 
omission of third party and in case of the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of navigational aids in 
the exercise of such function.  
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Further, if the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially 
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who 
suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may be 
exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such person.
102
 Under the 1992 
Civil Liability Convention, Article V (2), shipowners are deprived of the right to limit 
their liability if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from the shipowner’s 
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.
103
  
 
The 1992 Fund Convention, which is supplementary to the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention, establishes a regime for compensating victims when the compensation 
under the applicable Civil Liability Convention is inadequate.
104
  “Essentially there 
are three levels of liability limits; the first level borne by the shipowner through his 
protection and Indemnity insurer, and the second by cargo owner, namely the oil 
industry through the vehicle of a compensation fund financed through levies exacted 
from importers of oil in countries who are state parties to the Fund Convention”.105A 
third tier of compensation is in the form of a Supplementary Fund which was 
established on 3 March 2005 by means of a Protocol adopted in 2003.
106
  
 
3.6 USA Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 1990   
 
In the history of marine pollution regulation, nothing catalyses change more radically 
than a hug shipping disaster. The Amaco Cadiz spill in 1978 and the explosion of the 
Ixtoc I exploratory well in Mexico a year later promoted further concern for marine 
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environmental protection in the US.
107
 The United States Congress passed the OPA in 
the wake of several oil spills, most notably the Exxon Valdez spill
108
, to more 
adequately compensate those harmed by these spills.
109
 
The Preamble to the OPA 1990 states that the Act is to establish limitations on 
liability for damages resulting from oil pollution, to establish a fund for the payment 
of compensation for such damage(s).
110
 However, it can be assumed that, the effect of 
deterrence has been in the mind of the legislators, in order to make the waters of the 
United States safer and shipping activities cautious on the environmental issues.  
 
According to section 1002 of the Act, responsible parties, or those who are exposed to 
direct liability are inter alia; vessel owner, operator and demise charterer. However, 
time charterer, voyage charterer and cargo owners are exempt under the statute unless 
exposed under indemnity clauses.
111
 It should be mentioned that under the California 
statute, which is considered to be based on unlimited liability mechanism, any class of 
person who has an interest in the vessel including that of tanker owner, operator, 
charterers and manager are considered to be the responsible parties.
112
 Limit of 
liability for the mentioned responsible parties are stated in Section 1004 of the Act as 
follows: 
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the total of the liability of a responsible party under section 1002 and any 
removal costs incurred by, or on behalf of, the responsible party, with respect 
to each incident shall not exceed— (1) for a tank vessel, the greater of— (A) 
$1,200 per gross ton; or (B)(i) in the case of a vessel greater than 3,000 gross 
tons, $10,000,000; or (ii) in the case of a vessel of 3,000 gross tons or less, 
$2,000,000; (2) for any other vessel, $600 per gross ton or $500,000, 
whichever is greater. 
 
According to OPA 1990, Section 1003, which is concerning the defence of liability,  a 
responsible party is not liable for removal costs or damages under section 1002 if the 
responsible party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge 
or substantial threat of a discharge of oil and the resulting damages or removal costs 
were caused solely by an act of God, act of war and an act or omission of a third 
party, other than an employee or agent of the responsible party or a third party.
113
  
 
The limit of liability in OPA 1990 is considerably higher than the CLC
114
, and the 
mechanism for the loss of right to limit is distinctly different based on Section 1004 of 
the Act.
115
 Consequently, conduct barring limitation is made virtually impossible to 
break since it is based on gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
116
 The effect of the 
OPA 1990, is considered to be, as far as uniformity of law is concerned, “a double 
standard”, when taking into account the CLC Convention. On the other hand, higher 
limits of liability under the OPA and its impending unlimited liability under state law 
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put the international conventions in a position where it is difficult to consider them as 
effective as the OPA and make their ratification impossible.
117
  
 
Hill believes that the Act put the vessels trading to or from United States with full 
cargo of oil in danger of becoming uninsurable.
118
 The reason is that both the OPA 
1990 and the State law of California, require financial responsibility or capability and 
guarantee for the potential responsible parties to meet their maximum possible 
liability. Further, this “anticipatory responsibility” is not welcomed by the P&I clubs, 
due to its anticipatory nature, uncertainty of possible liability and considerable risk 
exposure.
119
  However, it is noted that the term ‘uninsurable’ mentioned above is no 
longer applicable, since there are independent insurance alternatives other than the 
P&I clubs in order to cover the shipowners excess liability.  
In contrast, the OPA is more advantageous to the victims with substantial 
compensation in comparison to the CLC 1992 Convention, especially when the event 
leading to litigation is a catastrophic spill.
120
 Gauci considers this as a positive 
development as the effect of OPA in implementing the polluter-pay principle, since 
the victims are adequately compensated.
121
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
117
Özçayair, supra note 12, p. 281. 
118
 Hill , supra note 43, p.442 
119
 Ibid, p. 445. 
120
 Ibid, p. 444. 
121 Gauci, supra note 113, p. 5. 
 35 
 
Chapter 4 
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES OF LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
 
 
Judicial attitude toward limitation of liability is of fundamental importance and 
relevance in legal inception of the concept of liability and its limitation concerning 
maritime law.  In particular, in some jurisdiction it embraces law-making as well as 
interpretation of law pertaining to limitation of liability whether it is based on national 
legislation or global conventions.  
 
4.1 Public Policy versus Justice 
 
Limitation of liability was awarded to the ship-owners long ago based on public 
policy to encourage the investment in a highly risky business, and the fact that many 
of those policy reasons are long gone, has made this particular subject of considerable 
importance in the maritime law domain. Lord Denning stated in the case of The 
Bramley Moore
122, in reference to a shipowner’s right to limit his liability, that “there 
is not much justice in this rule, but limitation of liability is not a matter of justice, it is  
a rule of public policy which has its origin in history and its justification in 
convenience”.123 Such a view was clearly stated in the case of The Amalia124 where 
Dr. Lushington described the statutory entrenchment of the principle of limitation of 
liability as a political stimulus to the growth of merchant shipping by affording 
shipowners statutory protection of their personal assets.
125
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Another recent example of the judicial attitude toward limitation of liability is the 
case of The Garden City No. 2
126
 where Griffiths L.J. stated that [limitation of 
Liability] is a long standing and generally accepted by the trading nations of the 
world. It is a right given to promote the general health of trade and in truth; it is no 
more than a way of distributing the insurance risk.
127
  
 
4.2 Conduct Barring Limitation 
 
Article 4 of the 1976 Convention is a product of the most radical change in the 
philosophy underlying the concept of a shipowner’s right to limit the extent of his 
liability for his acts and those of his servants.
128
 One of the opposing arguments based 
on law and policy considerations, was that the new test which converted what was 
originally a privilege into a right
129
 and has made it virtually unbreakable; much to the 
satisfaction of the marine insurance which ultimately has to indemnify the losses in 
most cases.
130
  
 
Hill stated that ironically this article [article 4], though only just under four lines in 
length possibly produces the most significant alteration from its corresponding Article 
in the 1957 Convention.
131
 Conduct barring limitation is a counter-balance to the 
concept of limitation of liability.  It is considered to be a counter-balance, since it is 
the result of the compromise struck between the parties, in particular when 
shipowners were being prepared for higher compensation and in return article 4 has 
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been created in such a way that is harder for the claimants to prove. The rationale by 
the insurance industry was that certainty of insurance liability was crucial for the 
shipping industry and therefore the quid pro quo for raised limits was a watertight 
provision making limits virtually unbreakable.
132
 
 
On the other hand the departure from the 1957 convention probably was that the 
actual fault and privity was subject of much litigation especially in the UK courts, 
since based on the 1957 convention “limitation was available in accordance with the 
provisions of the convention except where the occurrence giving rise to the claim 
resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner”. 133  From 1854 to 1986 
shipowners were not liable to pay damages beyond the limit of liability if certain 
occurrences took place without their “actual fault or privity”.134  During the 1976 
conference on limitation of liability, it was decided that the words “actual fault or 
privity” no longer afforded sufficient protection to shipowners. Shipowners were 
prepared to agree higher limits of liability in exchange for certainty of the right to 
limit their liability.
135
   
  
Conduct barring limitation was imported into maritime law from other conventions or 
from instruments in other field, notably in aviation.
136
  The first maritime instrument 
to incorporate the new test was the Hague-Visby Rules of 1968, which reflect the 
current regime.
137
 Notwithstanding the rationale for compromise mentioned above, 
the 1976 Convention was an effort to balance the interests of shipowners and 
insurance industry; however it is evident that with the wording of the article 4 
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according to which the burden of proof shifted to the claimants
138
 who suffered 
damage or injury, the current system is unfair to the victim.
139
  
 
In a clear explanation the “the new test imposed on the claimant a “double barrelled 
burden of proof”, first in the ordinary course of litigation, the claimant as plaintiff had 
to carry the burden of proof with regard to the merits of his claim”, second, the 
claimant, would also need to prove that the shippowner was not entitled to limit his 
liability.
140
According to the old test, the onus of proof fell on the shipowner to show 
that he was entitled to limit his liability “the reversal of onus reflected the principle 
that limitation was a privilege and not a right.
141
 
 
4.3 The Rule of Attribution 
 
At the present time the rule of attribution
142
  mainly concerns the development of ship 
ownership from the traditional ownership to the modern corporate one.  The situation 
was easier at a time, when the owner was also the master of the ship, since the 
establishment of the person liable for the fault was known and easy. Nevertheless, 
with the advancement of shipping companies and corporations it is harder to establish 
the actual fault or privity of the shipowner through the rule of attribution.  
The owners, managers, operators, and charterers of ships are corporate bodies. In law, 
a personality is attributed to a corporation by a fiction. Since a corporation is not a 
living person, the attribution of liability to a corporation was originally solved by the 
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development of a concept known as the ‘alter ego’.143 In such cases the vital point is 
how to prove ‘personal act’ of the company and proof of personal act or omission of 
the alter ego of the company will be essential to such assessment. This is related to 
cases where the decision-making power or authority is delegated to another body or 
agent within the corporate structure.   
 
Under English law, the test of actual fault, privity and the concept of the alter ego 
requirements were established in the cases of the Lady Gwendolen
144
 and the 
Marion
145
.  The Marion set out the criteria to determine who the alter ego of the 
company is. According to the mentioned case, the alter ego of the company includes 
members of the board of the directors and the person dealing with actual management 
and control over the relevant branch of the company’s business. According to English 
law, acts of the master of the ship cannot be attributed to the shipowner in terms of 
proving the shipowner’s personal act or omission under Article 4 of the LLMC 
1976.
146
  
 
Moreover in the case of Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd.
147
 
the court held that, upon the true construction of section 503 of the MSA 1894
148
, the 
fault or privity must be the fault or privity of someone who is not merely a servant or 
agent for whom the company is liable, but somebody for whom the company is liable 
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because his action is the very action of the company itself.
149
 In the same case Lord 
Justice Buckley stated that “the words actual fault or privity in my judgment infers 
something personal to the owner, something blameworthy in him, as distinguished 
from constructive fault or privity such as the fault or privity of his servants or agents. 
In addition Lord Justice Hamilton added that “actual fault negatives that liability 
which arises solely under the rule of respondeat superior.
150
  
 
Civil liability for collision is based on the existence of “fault” which contributes or 
causes the collision.
151
 In general, when a shipowner applies for a decree of limitation, 
he must show that the incident was not caused by his actual fault and privity, but also 
that he has not contributed to the actual fault or privity. In considering whether the 
shipowner is guilty, the court will look at his conduct leading to the incident.
152
  
 
In the Lady Gwendolen case, a collision occurred due to the vessel being sailed in full 
speed in thick fog. The radar was switched on but was not observed at all times by the 
master. The shipowner’s superintendent had failed to examine the ship’s log, where 
he could have found about the master’s full speed in that condition. He also failed to 
transmit the notice of the Ministry of Transport to the master urging the vessels to 
reduce speed in such a poor visibility. It is submitted that the master also did not have 
a proper training in the use of the radar. The fault of the marine superintendent on its 
own would not have been sufficient to amount to that of the shipowners, as he was too 
far down the corporate hierarchy for his acts to be identified with that of the company.  
 
On the other hand, in the case of The Marion, the vessel fouled a pipeline cause by 
using an outdated chart. The manager was at fault, so the fault as a matter of law, was 
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the actual fault of the shipowner. In other word the shipowner’s failure to establish a 
system to check on the master’s in having and using an updated chart caused the 
accident.  
 
The main issue in these cases were that under the 1957 convention, a shipowner or 
salvor would not be able to limit their liability unless they could prove that the 
reckless or negligent act were occurred without their actual fault or privity. Further, in 
such cases, since the agent or employee of the shipowner were distance or far down 
the corporate hierarchy, it would have been difficult to show that the reckless act was 
directly attributed to the shipowner himself. However, the fault of the marine 
superintendent had become that of the company because of the failure of its managing 
director and traffic manager to take any interest in navigational matters, the 
shipowners therefore lost their right to limit. In other word, the collision did not take 
place without the actual fault or privity of the owner and that owning company was 
barred from limiting its liability. In the case of Eurythenes, 
153
Lord Denning MR 
stated that; 
 
when the old common lawyers spoke of a man being ‘privy’ to something 
being done, or an act being done ‘with his privity’, they meant that he knew of 
it beforehand and concurred in it being done. If it was a wrongful act done by 
his servant, then he was liable for it if it was done ‘by his command or privity 
that is, with his express authority or with his knowledge and concurrence. 
‘Privity’ did not mean that there was any wilful misconduct by him, but only 
that he knew of the act beforehand and concurred in it being done.
154
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In both cases there was no intentional or reckless wrongdoing by any employee with a 
status sufficient for his acts to be attributed to the owning company. Although the 
master of the Lady Gwendolen acted recklessly , not only would  he have been 
insufficiently senior in the corporate hierarchy for his recklessness to be attributed to 
the owning company , but Art 4 also requires that there must be “knowledge” that 
such loss would probably result. This element, together with the transfer of the burden 
of proof to the claimant, makes it almost impossible to negate the right of limitation. 
Under the new test, the right to limit would almost certainly not have been lost in 
either the Lady Gwendolen or the Marion.
155
  
 
It should be noted that one of the reasons behind the leniency of the judges toward the 
claimants was that during those times there had been many collisions and therefore 
under the same public policy doctrine, there has been tendencies to reduce such 
occurrences as Sheen J. stated that on the decision of the Lady Gwendolen, he had 
remembered Hewson J. affirming that “if shipowners disregarded advice then the only 
way to make them listen was to hit them in their pockets”.156  The Marion case was 
the last limitation action under the old law, and it merely illustrates the lengths to 
which the courts have gone to defeat a right which Parliament gave to shipowners. 
But in the end the shipowners have gained ascendancy by the enactment of a law 
consistent with the 1976 Convention on limitation of liability.
157
 
 
4.4 Personal Injury Cases 
 
Limitation of liability permits a shipowner to claim a limit upon his damages, in 
respect of, among others, death or personal injuries. In this section, some cases related 
to such category is considered since it seems that the judges were more sympathetic 
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toward the victims and on the other hand has used such cases to put more pressure on  
shipowners to observe safety of the crews and those pertaining to the shipping safety.  
 
In the case of The Anonity,
158
 although the crew had been given clear instruction by a 
letter in order to avoid any kind of spark, other than ignition when lying near an oil 
jetty, the court rejected the letter as warning to the crew, requesting “arresting 
warning notice” near the event and thereby refusing the claim for a decree of 
limitation. The owners argued that the negligence was not the actual fault of 
shipowners.  
The case of Dayspringe
159
 is another example where it was hard to attribute the fault 
of a collision to the board of directors of the owning company of having two men on 
the bridge at the time of the collision of Dayspringe with Auspicity. The court refused 
to grant the owner of Dayspringe a decree of limitation, asserting that if clear 
instruction where given, then an officer would have been on the bridge in addition to 
the helmsman.  The background to the case is that, at the time, there was many 
casualties for similar incident and there has been many investigation on the matter, 
meaning that the situation promoted the judges to make shipowners notice the danger 
and to have a proper communication with the crew to minimise the casualties.
160
 This 
somehow corresponds to the deterrence nature of liability which will be discussed 
further in the thesis in connection with limitation of liability.  
 
In addition, under the 1976 (Article 4), the test no longer involves the actual fault or 
privity of the owner. New definition requires proof of loss resulting from personal act 
or omission of the person liable for the loss that was committed with intent to cause 
such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge, that such loss would probably result.  It 
will still be required to perform the test for determining the ‘alter ego’ of the 
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corporate person seeking to limit, the so-called Lady Gwendolen test, since it is 
necessary to find the personal acts or omissions of the party liable”.161  
 
A recent Canadian case on the limitation of liability and application of Article 4 is the 
case of Peracomo Inc. v.  Société Telus Communications
162
, with some similarity to 
the case of the Marion, in which the plaintiff was the owner of two submarine cables 
on the bottom of the St. Lawrence River. The defendants were the corporate owner 
and operator of a fishing vessel who was also the principal of the owner. The operator 
tore up one of the submarine cables belonging to the plaintiff while fishing. The 
operator cut the cables with a saw believing that it was not in use. A few days later he 
did the same thing a second time.  
 
The plaintiff commenced proceedings alleging negligence and damages of 
approximately USD 1 million to repair the cable. The defendants denied liability 
stating that insufficient notice had been given of the location of the cables in the chart 
and that, in any event, the cables should have been buried. The defendants further 
disputed the damages and claimed the right to limit liability. On the issue related to 
limitation of liability the trial Judge noted that to avoid limitation the plaintiff had to 
prove personal act or omission of the defendant committed either “with intent to cause 
such loss” or “recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”. 
The trial Judge held that this test had been met and the defendants were not entitled to 
limit liability.
163
   
 
Considering the landmark cases mentioned in this chapter, initially, most of the judges 
acknowledged that the doctrine is rooted in history; a possible interpretation will be 
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that it is so entwined with the history of maritime law, that it is used as a considerable 
factual justification for its continuity.  
 
On the other hand, in some cases taking into consideration the realities of the trade in 
maritime field, and considering the exigencies of the occurrences such as safety at 
sea, seafarer’s condition in personal injury or death scenarios and increase of 
accidents, judges attempted to shift their attention more toward justice rather than the 
influential concept of public policy, a notion once acknowledged by them not relevant 
to the concept of limitation, but commercial and legal convenience. Most importantly, 
based on the 1957 Convention, judges had more flexibility in dealing with or granting 
the privilege of limitation of liability but with the wording of the Article 4 of the 1976 
Convention, as submitted before, the uncertainty of the case decisions are gone with 
the flexibility of judges.  
 
In the following section the effect of International Safety Management (ISM) Code on 
conduct barring limitation pertaining to Article 4 of the 1976 Convention will be 
considered. Due to the fact that today almost every carrier or shipowner is a 
corporation, the effect of the ISM Code on the attribution of fault will be important to 
conduct barring limitation in article 4 of the 1976 Convention. 
 
4.5 International Safety Management Code 
 
Through 1994 amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), 1974, which introduced a new chapter XI
164
, into the Convention, the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code was made mandatory.
165
 As part of 
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SOLAS, the ISM Code is regarded as one of the pragmatic mechanism that the IMO 
has heralded to tackle poor management of shipping. 
It is noted that the existence of the ISM Code and the Designated Person Ashore 
(DPA) may assist in unravelling the complex problem of the alter ego in cases 
relating to Article 4 of the LLMC 1976.
166
 The Code was created with the purpose of 
improving and extending the standards of maritime safety by establishing a written 
Safety Management System (SMS) for every shipowner or manager (refer to as “the 
Company” in the ISMC Code).167 The ISM Code has affected shipping operation, but 
has also some impact on legal aspects in relation to liability issues. The most 
important are the liability arising out of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship under 
contracts of carriage and the insurance requirements related to the seaworthiness of 
the ship.
168
 
One of the most imperative articles in the ISMC, which is relevant to this part of 
discussion, is article 4 of the ISM code, which requires shipowners to appoint 
Designated Person Ashore (DPA), who has direct access to the highest level of 
management within the owning company.
169
 It is conceivable that with such a system 
in place, it will be easier or at least more convincing, to challenge some elements of 
the requirements related to the right to limit in the terms of Article 4 of the 1976 
Convention. This, however, is hard to prove since it is related to the practical 
consequence of the effect of the ISMC and in particular DPA on litigation. There is no 
precedent to support this at least in relation to DPA.  
With advancement of the communication, where the ship-owners constantly are in 
contact with their ship, the establishment of a control factor is easier than before. The 
effect of such development in communication between the shipowner and his ship is 
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that the shipowner does have enough knowledge (privity) on the whereabouts and 
condition of his vessel, so it is possible that the privity and personal fault will be 
easier to establish in comparison with past conditions.  
 
Thus, the distinctive effect of Article 4 of the ISMC is that it shows that the alter ego 
of the company is in a position that with the employment of the designated person has 
in fact actual or imputed knowledge of the facts which give rise to legal liability.
170
 
This is supported by the fact that the whole purpose of the Article 4 is based on the 
communication between the DPA and a senior director. In another word it is based on 
a system which contemplates report from the DPA and is bound to gain reaction to 
such report, from the senior director(s). Lord Donaldson has referred to the role and 
connection of DPA and the alter ego of the company, as “the errant shipowner’s 
Achilles heel”171 with the following statement: 
 
The blind eye’ shipowner is faced with a catch 22 situation. If he hears 
nothing from the Designated Person, he will be bound to call for reports, for it 
is inconceivable there will be nothing to report. If the report is to the effect 
that all is well in a perfect world, the shipowner would be bound to enquire 
how that could be, as the safety management system is clearly intended to be a 
dynamic system which is subject to continuous change in the light, not only of 
the experience of the individual ship, and of the Company as a whole, but also 
of the experience of others in the industry. So there will always be something 
to report. Quite apart from this, the shipowner can at any time be called upon 
to produce documentary evidence of his internal audits of every area of his 
system including the work of the Designated Person.
172
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The rationale for such statement is based on the fact that the Safety Management 
System is intended to be a dynamic system susceptible to constant change, meaning 
that if the DPA fails to report to the senior director or even if there is a report 
indicating that the state of safety is well, it is the duty of the shipowner to enquire 
about every report either way.  
 
It is hard to identify the DP as the alter ego of the company without establishing 
his/her relation to the company, the rule of attribution (or the identification doctrine) 
will follow from the same procedures as mentioned in the conduct barring limitation 
above, similarly in the same case it will be identified as the alter ego of the company 
depending on the assignment of his responsibility and identification within the 
corporate or company structure.  
 
However in cases, where by application of the normal rule of attribution, it is difficult 
to identify the person in question with the ego of the company, the courts may apply 
“the Meridian rule of attribution”.173 By this approach, the court has to interpret the 
substantive rule of law under which liability is sought in order to determine whether 
the policy or the intention of the substantive rule requires the court to attribute 
liability to the company in question, even if the person is ranked lower in the 
hierarchy of the company’s directing mind.174   
 
As such, if a designated person is identified as the manager of the ship, or is a person 
whose act, omission, neglect or fault constitute as that of the shipowner, such person 
is entitled to limit his liability under the 1976 Convention. However, it should also be 
kept in mind that, as with any other person liable under the 1976 Convention system, 
                                                             
173
 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 All ER 918. 
174
 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra, note 139, Page 919. 
 49 
a designated person will also lose his right to limitation if he is guilty of the conduct 
specified in Article 4 of the 1976 Convention.
175
   
 
 In summary, it is believed that the ISM has not affected the range of liability to which 
the ship operators and other involved in the maritime and insurance sectors, but it has 
certainly changed the expectation by potential claimants and the courts, in particular 
existence of specific objective evidence.
176
 However, if the factual situation of The 
Lady Gwendolen, The Marion, The Garden City and The Anonity, were to be decided 
today with the ISMC in place, questions would be raised as to how and why the 
directing mind of the company was unable to ensure that an appropriate safety system 
was not in operation. Such enquiry will reveal that the directing mind of the company, 
failed to act or omitted to correct any inadequacy, on the knowledge (report) provided 
by the ISMC. In addition it will show that the failure of the ego of the company, were 
reckless as to the consequences, through his act or omission to do the thing that would 
have prevented the kind of loss claimed.
177
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Chapter 5 
MULTI-PERSPECTIVES ANALYSIS ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
 
5.1 Deliberation; Limitation as Anachronism or Necessity 
 
In view of modern day analysis limitation of liability has been around for a long time, 
it has served its purpose with justifications that are no longer valid. It has its 
advocates for its continuation and antagonists’ criticism for its application. As far 
back as 1625, the Dutch jurist, Grotius, submitted that men would be deterred from 
employing ships if they lay under the perpetual fear of being answerable for the acts 
of their masters to an unlimited extent.
178
   
 
There are several principal grounds of opposition with limitation of liability 
embracing different categories of argumentations. For instance in a broader view, the 
opposition argue that limitation of liability doctrine affords shipowners a unique 
privilege with no economic justification. Others believe that one of the reasons or 
justification for retention of the limitation regime is a pragmatic one which concerns 
claims arising from the operation of a ship which may arise in any part of the world. 
Consequently if the offending ship is arrested, the admiralty court will give a 
limitation to the shipowner and the claimants can get damages up to the value of the 
ship
179
  Another point of view in support of the limitation of liability, relies on the 
historical justification, leaning on the principle associated with general average, 
meaning joint adventure and distribution of the risks.
180
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Some form of argumentation is equated with a reformist view, such as that a law of 
limitation has its basis, if any, in the finances of merchant shipping and therefore 
should not be applied to pleasure craft.
181
  Probably the strongest opposition 
arguments emanates from those who submit that having insurance as a source for 
compensation and the fact that  corporate limitation already enjoyed by shipowners, 
makes the case for proponents of limitation of liability unnecessary and in a weaker 
position. These argumentations with legalistic and legal- economic viewpoints will be 
discussed in the proceeding chapters with a brief introduction to “economic analysis 
of the law”.  
 
5.2 Legal Expectation of Justice 
 
Liability is “a breach of standard of conduct, behaviour or action”, and the concept of 
limitation is properly expressed by the term “limitation of damages or compensation”, 
or it is the amount or quantum of damages that is limited by the application of the 
doctrine of limitation”.182 One of the important arguments which the opposition to 
limitation of liability purposes, at least regarding damages, is that there is “no legal 
basis for retention of limitation of liability”.183 
 
The obvious reason for such submission is that a person who damages or cause 
damage to the property of another should pay for it or at least the law should provide 
some form of remedy which leads to restitutio in integrum. In civil litigation the vast 
majority of claims are for damages to compensate the plaintiff for the damage which 
he has suffered by reason of the conduct of the defendant. That conduct may have 
been a breach of contract, or it may have been negligence.
184
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The principle of limitation of liability is that the full indemnity, the natural right of 
justice, will be abridged for political reasons.
185
 In another word limitation is a 
“matter of public policy not law”. 186  This conflict of law and policy has been 
recognised by Lord Blackburn in Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsula 
and Oriental Navigation Company
187
, where he submitted that there appeared to be 
some injustice in reducing liability owed by those who are to blame to those who are 
not to blame.
188
 It is apparent that the concept of limitation of liability goes against the 
basic concept in law of restitutio in integram. That is, once the level of damages has 
been assessed, then the settlement should be in full.  Full compensation will be 
regarded and result in materialisation of unlimited liability. The wrongdoer should 
restore the aggrieved party to its former state, as if he had not broken the contract or 
committed a tort.
189
 
 
5.3 Legal- Economic Theory Analysis  
 
 
Economic analysis of law tend to answer two main questions about legal rules, such 
as the effect of a legal rule on the behaviour of the rational actors in a particular field, 
and consequently, whether those effects are socially desirable.
190
 From a legal 
perspective, a liability regime has various functions such as provision of 
compensation to the victims who have suffered harm. In economics, it is argued that 
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providing compensation is no longer the primary purpose of private law because 
accident insurance is generally available in modern societies.
191
  
 
As such liability is viewed as a devise for compensating the victims of harm, but it is 
argued that insurance can also provide compensation more cheaply than the liability 
system.
192
 Basically, legal liability for accident is governed by tort law, and it is 
through such medium that society can reduce the risk of harm by penalising potential 
injurers with having to compensate for the harm they cause.
193
   
 
Economist analysis of law employ two basic rules of liability, strict liability, and the 
negligence rule (fault-based liability). According to the strict liability the injurer must 
always pay for the injury caused. However, in the negligence rule which is the 
dominant form of liability, the injurer must always pay for the harm caused 
conditional to the standard of duty of care.
194
  One example of the economic analysis 
of law relating to the strict liability
195
 regime is provided bellow to illustrate the 
arguments provided in this section: 
 
Under strict liability, injurers pay damages equal to h
196
 whenever an accident 
occurs, and they naturally bear the cost of care x. Thus, they minimize x +p(x) 
h; accordingly, they choose x*.Under the negligence rule, suppose that the due 
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care level x is set equal to x*, meaning that an injurer who causes harm will 
have to pay h if x <x* but will not have to pay anything if x > x*. Then it can 
be shown that the injurer will choose x*: clearly, the injurer will not choose x 
greater than x*, for that will cost him more and he will escape liability by 
choosing merely x*; and he will not choose x <x*, for then he will be liable 
(in which case the analysis of strict liability shows that he would not choose x 
<x*).
197
  
 
 
 
The primary social function of liability system is viewed as the provision of 
incentives to reduce risk or prevent harm.
198
 Those incentive will form the actions that 
the injurer, and in different type of scenarios, the victim, can take to alter the risk, for 
instance in cases of collision or pollution, arrangements to take optimal care to 
prevent collision or pollution is regarded as the actions required by the shipowners.  
 
The reference to both parties, namely the injurer and the victim in a given situation, 
here the collision or resultant pollution, is borrowed from the famous article of Ronald 
Coase
199
, where it is suggested that the traditional view where A injures B, the 
standing or influential view is that A should compensate B in monetary form, but 
Coase believes that, this is a reciprocal problem and both A and B are engaged in the 
process, or both parties are “inputs in the production of damage”.200   
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Further in such analysis, the accident is divided into Unilateral and Bilateral 
accidents. Unilateral accident is where injurer alone can influence the risk, whereas in 
bilateral accident, both inurer and injured effect the risk.
201
  In the economic analysis 
of the law, such examination assume that both parties are risk neutral and that the 
analysis consider two sub-subject to the study, namely, the level of duty of care and 
the level of activity.
202
  
 
Dr. Xu has applied this theoretical economic analysis of law to the Civil Liability 
Convention 1969, in which a strict liability system is applicable to oil spills, and 
considers that limitation of liability may be necessary as a supplementary method to 
provide incentive for the victim to take care only when oil spills are viewed as 
bilateral accidents. However, in cases where oil spills are viewed as unilateral 
accidents, it may be desirable to employ unlimited liability
203
  If we assume that the 
injured in a given scenario is natural environment or natural resources, by employing 
the unilateral accident and reciprocity of the connection between the injurer and the 
injured mentioned above, it is submitted that the environment or natural resources 
cannot observe the implied precaution, in this type of problems, the unlimited liability 
is desirable, since this will fall under the unilateral accident.
204
  
 
Thus, based on the division of mentioned bilateral and unilateral assessments, it is 
shown that both systems of limited and unlimited liability are required for different 
type of problems for instance in pollution cases. Similar analogies are applicable to 
fishermen and the polluters of natural resources, although the fishermen are able to 
locate, but they are not able to affect the situation in a polluted environment.  
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Further, economic analysis of the law employs two distinct examination methods 
which includes a descriptive and normative analysis. For example if we take 
limitation of liability as our object of examination, in a descriptive analysis, the first 
enquiry is about examination of the limitation mechanism on the behaviour of the 
shipowner. In doing so, the examination tend to measure the behaviour of the 
shipowner in observing due care to prevent or reduce collision or pollution at sea. On 
the other hand the normative examination, concerns with the fact  that whether the 
rule in question, taking into consideration the employment of governmental 
interference in creating regulation, is socially desirable for the polluter by comparing 
the cost on shipowner.
205
 In order to assess the social desirability of liability and 
regulation, in economic analysis of law, the following is considered: 
 
 It is necessary to set out a measure of social welfare; and here that measure is 
assumed to equal the benefits parties derive from engaging in their activities, 
less the sum of the costs of precautions, the harms done, and the 
administrative expenses associated with the means of social control.
206
  
 
The cost in the above analysis includes the increased cost for precaution, or reduced 
activities and administration cost. The comparison is ultimately between the cost of 
shipowner, and the benefit of having a pollution-free sea or reduced collision at sea 
for the industry and for the community at large.
207
  
 
 On the ground that economists tend to be more interested about maximising 
production value and allocation of resources, Coase submit that the legal rules is 
about who has the right to do something( what) but when the transaction is costless, 
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the right can be rearranged.
208
 Moreover it is submitted that the so-called “polluter-
pays principle”, which is rooted in the traditional economic theory of internalisation 
of externality, suggest that government interfere through various mechanisms so that 
the external costs are internalised by the polluter”.209  
 
 However, Robert Cooter, in reference to Coase theorem which identifies the problem 
of externalities with the cost of the bargaining process, rejects such theorem and 
submits that it is illuminating falsehoods because it offers a guide to structuring law in 
the interest of efficiency.
210
  In addition, it has been submitted that the shifting of loss 
is justified as a device to achieve maximum efficiency in the allocation of resources 
by shifting losses to those in the best position to either prevent or avoid accidents or 
minimise the amount of loss.
211
 It is for this reason that under economic studies, it has 
been argued that limitation of damages will reduce the required incentive for the 
shipowners to take optimal care in reducing or minimising the loss. But in contrast, 
even if shipowners were to pay full compensation, in particular in the case of the one-
ship companies, that will result in what is called a “judgment proof” case.212 
 
5.4 Compensation versus Deterrence  
 
 
There are many issues and points of argumentation regarding compensation 
mechanism, from analysis of what the purpose of compensation is, to highlighting 
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lack or inadequacy of compensation in the LLMC 1976 or other international 
conventions. As it has been mentioned earlier in the thesis, one of the most significant 
changes regarding limitation of liability convention was the increase of the 
compensation with the 1996 Protocol to the 1976 Convention.  
 
Following the legal-economic analysis mentioned above, which was related to the 
actual activities of the shipping industry and the cost for precaution, there is another 
dimension which is associated with the efficiency of compensation mechanism. With 
such viewpoint one focuses on the issue related to the actual cost of litigation and 
compensation mechanism, since the whole idea of economic analysis of law is about 
efficiency. The central problem with the concept of limitation of liability is the lack 
and inadequacy of compensation to the victim, in particular not from the liable party 
but from other sources.
213
 However, since victims can obtain insurance, which were 
mentioned earlier, then the legal system need not be relied on to provide 
compensation. It is noted that providing compensation through legal rules tends to be 
significantly more expensive than doing so through insurance.
214
  
 
 One issue related to the above criticism is that the notion of justice and fairness is 
somehow ignored when considering the victim, but it is also relevant that it is the 
quantum of damages which is limited as it is the liability concept that is related to the 
justice and fairness, is intact, since it has been proven and assessed prior to the award 
of damages.  The term polluter-pay principle is sometimes referring to the idea that 
the polluter should compensate the victim, whereas the said principle is mainly 
concerned with polluter being charged with the cost of pollution prevention and 
control measures.
215
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In normal circumstances deterrence should be a logical factor behind liability system 
such as in tort cases. It seems that with the limitation of liability system in place; such 
important justification for correction of the conduct of the wrongdoer is partially 
paralysed. By controlling the magnitude of liability, limitation of liability reduces the 
expected liability of shipowners and consequently their optimal precaution and 
encourages negligent navigation.
216
 Although the above analysis is relevant to some 
degree, in particular concerning the end-result of deterrence factor related to 
rectification of negligent conduct , but one cannot ignore the application of many 
safety mechanisms in place  for instance collision, shipping safety measures by 
national and respective international organisations such as International Maritime 
Organization. When this argumentation is considered in isolation to the above facts, 
the analysis is correct but with other safety mechanisms in the shipping industry to 
regulate safety of navigation, it seems that the deterrence factor is exaggerated to 
some extent.  
 
 In addition to the above examples of safety mechanism, some has argued that if 
channelling of liability were to be restricted only to the shipowner, without holding 
other actors, such as charterers, to be jointly and severally responsible for the incident 
that will deter for instance the charterers from using sub-standard ships. A clear 
example for this is OPA 1990, where the charterers are included in the responsible 
parties or class of persons exposed to liability. On the other hand, since the main 
purpose of the CLC/Fund, HNSC
217
 and Bunkers Conventions is compensation, it has 
been submitted that those can be redesigned to promote deterrence, behavioural 
change and incentive for compliance. Thus, a more widely burden-sharing regime, 
will promote quality shipping.
218
 Whether unlimited liability will make the shipping 
activists more vigilant about their duty of care, due diligence and seaworthiness might 
be questionable but in economic terms, unlimited liability mechanism will prove to be 
effective as the parties will have a considerable asset to lose in comparison to having 
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limited liability. The main problem with limitation of liability is not under-
compensation of the victim, but under-deterrence of shipowners.
219
 
 
 
5.5 Limitation of Liability and Role of Insurance  
 
The issues related to the insurance sector, at least in relation to the concept of 
limitation of liability topic, embraces several matters among which the most important 
are certainty, reinsurance, limited and unlimited liability. Limitation of liability ought 
to be for the shipowners alone, but with development of the 1957 Convention and in 
particular the 1976 Convention, other group or persons also benefit from the concept 
of limitation.  
 
One particular field which benefit directly or indirectly from the convention and 
regulation related to limitation of liability is the insurance industry.  Article 1(6) of 
the 1976 Convention introduced another class of person entitle to limit, namely the 
insurer, who is entitle to limit liability “to the same extent as the assured” through 
direct action mechanism. The effect of Article 1(6) of the 1976 Convention is that if 
the insurer is being sued by third party under the 1930 Act (third parties)
220
, it can 
plead limitation of liability when this is applicable and has not been raised by the 
assured.
221
  
 
Although insurance cover is different and conspicuously separate from the 
shipowner’s limitation of liability, there is one connection between the two, that the 
insurer covers only shipowner’s liability. In the same line of analysis, the shipowner 
can limit his liability because he has no cover for the excess of the limitation fund or 
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the P& I clubs are basically covering whatever the amount of limitation is being 
assessed.
222
In another word, the insurer gain indirect benefit from successful 
limitation by the shipowner since the usual policy term provides that the insurer will 
pay up to but not beyond the assured legal liability.
223
  
 
It is now a common concept that certainty is the most important element in the 
insurance industry for calculation of the risk, and possible liability in case of a 
casualty or incident in marine insurance. For instance, the Hull underwriters knows 
the maximum amount of his exposure to a risk, namely the insured values as a result 
of this certainty, he is only paying for this amount and associated legal fees.
224
 It is 
submitted that the unlimited liability proponents ignores the problem of realistic 
insurable limits, as the clubs insurance considerably depends on the cost of the 
reinsurance.
225
  
 
At a practical level limitation most directly benefit the insurers of shipowner’s 
liability and in turn, benefit shipowners in the lower premiums they are required to 
pay for such insurance cover.
226
 In contrast, the only benefit for the claimants is that 
they are ensured of the availability of the insurance cover for the liability incurred and 
the liability fund available to satisfy their claims.
227
 It has been argued that the role of 
insurance in compensating the injured party on behalf of the defendant (tortfeasors) 
negates any justification concerning subsidising the shipowners or retaining the 
limitation of liability for that matter.  
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On the other hand, in defence of insurance industry and its interconnection to liability 
and damages, it has been observed that insurance is a useful social tool and the 
distribution of the risk through limitation of liability will enable tortfeasors to escape 
ruin and also enable the injured parties to recover damages which they are awarded 
rather than to be left with a “barren judgement”.228 This, however, touches on two 
different but analogous protection mechanisms through public policy device such as 
the protection and survival of the insurance industry and the shipowners since 
application of higher award of compensation, means higher insurance premiums.
229
  
 
It has been mentioned that the problem of non-availability of insurance or higher 
premium for insurance cover is one justification for retention of limitation of liability. 
However having widespread insurance cover, in particular third party insurance for 
the shipping industry is a reason to assume that one of the arguments for retention of 
limitation of liability specific to maritime field is refuted. This has also been 
suggested as an alternative for a shift of limitation to the insurance providers, but not 
the negligent party. 
 
 Professor Wetterstein
230
 submitted that the insurance cost cannot be as a key 
argument for limitation of maritime liability since there are other means of supporting 
the national fleet, and not at the expense of the injured parties. The alternative that it 
is suggested for minimising the cost of insurance in the absence of limitation of 
liability is that insurance could have a ceiling for covering liability similar to the P&I 
clubs in cases of unlimited liability concerning oil pollution, as no insurer will accept 
unlimited liability.
231
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5.6 Promotion of the Trade 
 
 
The most widespread and highly cited justifications for retention of limitation of 
liability are the promotion and encouragement of shipping and insurance industries 
which is also considerably challenged by many scholars. The premises for such 
support emanate from the fact that shipping industry is engaged in perilous adventure 
and need capital and investment to prosper. Without limitation of liability potential 
investment might be dissuaded from entering the shipping industry.
232
  
 
In addition, the application of limitation will attract people to invest and consequently 
it will build up a competitive mercantile shipping industry at national and 
international level.  The counter arguments for such support submit that sea voyages 
and the degree of “perils of the sea” are not as dangerous as it used to be due to 
technological development and advanced communication.
233
 Gauci criticised Tetley 
in stating that “peril of the sea” is a factor justifying limitation of liability, as “the 
term perils of the sea” has some significance, it may be said to be indicative of the 
typical risks appertaining to sea-transportation.  
 
However, other adversaries of limitation argue that investment in shipping is also 
satisfactorily widespread so that the shipping industry does not require any special 
treatment.
234
 In respond to such argument it has been emphasised that although 
limitation of liability provides support to shipowners, it has been a catalyst in 
increasing the need for a larger workforce for shipping industry and also other 
industries providing services to shipping, such as insurance.
235
 In the same line of the 
argument, the opposition to limitation of liability propose that even if the shipping 
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industry needs support it should not be by way of subsidising a minority group against 
the public interest or discriminatory in nature. 
 
5.7 Corporate Limitation and Maritime Limitation of liability  
 
One of the arguments against the shipowners’ limitation of liability is that in the 
corporate world, shipowners are actually able to limit their liability by reducing or 
limiting their capital to what is called the “One Ship Company”.236 This reasoning is a 
well-founded argument since if the availability of corporate limitation was enough in 
protecting the shipowners, then such justification for limitation of liability, as an 
extended protection mechanism, will negate its logical ground. However it has been 
argued that this method is part of the general corporate law and is not in any way 
unique to shipowners.
237
  
On the other hand the same argument has been used to justify retention of the 
limitation of liability as a remarkable factor, since it has survived the development 
and ready availability of corporate limitation.
238
 It is of course claimed that by the 
universal use of the corporate device, limitation of liability is of much less economic 
importance than it was in the past. Nevertheless, even where a ship, or a fleet of ships, 
is owned by a corporation, the privilege of limitation will insulate the remaining 
corporate assets from claims for which they would otherwise be subject.
239
  
 
In reference to the 1957 convention, Sheen J. stated that the combined effect of the 
decisions in the landmark cases of the Norman
240
  and The Lady Gwendolen had 
created public exposure of the whole organisation or corporation when the shipowner 
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commenced action claiming a decree of limitation. The public exposure was not in the 
interest of the shipowners and that these cases were considered to be a turning point in 
that shipowners never again enjoyed the right to limit their liability as much as their 
underwriters expected.
241
   
 
Limitation of liability has a direct connection with the corporation system, as Sheen J. 
believes that parliament created corporation with limited liability, but judges had a 
limited scope to deal with that because they were protected by the law, but the 
introduction of the  “sister ship arrest” was a mechanism to deal with such protection. 
The response of the shipping industry was the creation of the “one ship” company, 
provoking attempts to lift the corporate veil.
242
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
241  Sheen, supra note 130, p. 477. 
242 Ibid, p. 475. 
 66 
Chapter 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
While examining historical background to the origin and development of the concept 
of the limitation of liability in the first chapter, the issues that has been covered, 
shows that at the time when there was no insurance in the modern day term, the 
concept of limitation of liability was a mechanism for sharing the loss by different 
participants. It can be safely deduced from such study that the sharing of the ‘loss of 
the adventure’ and assets were to distribute the risks attached to the maritime 
activities including the distribution of risk in the context of cargo responsibility and 
the wider industry perspective, a principle which is still a valid justification for 
retention of limitation of liability and beneficial to maritime related industries. 
If we consider the concept of limitation of liability through a public policy lens, its 
objective of distribution of risks, as a catalyst factor, is fulfilled considering the 
growth of the insurance industry including the protection and indemnity clubs.  The 
fact that insurance is available, the counter-argument for shifting the burden of 
liability to those who are responsible in circumstances is also valid and notable.  
 
 It has been stated that the primary characteristics of the limitation of liability was that 
the shipowner‘s liability was limited to the value of his vessel in that particular 
adventure merely for the reason that that ship was the instrument of the loss. Later 
with codification of the concept of limitation in Europe, the shipowner’s other vessels 
or properties were spared in the assessment of his liability, a similar notion to the 
corporate limitation of liability. Similarly, this is used as justification by both camps 
for retention and abolishment of the concept of limitation of liability. 
The common law concept of limitation of liability was briefly discussed which is tied 
to or entwined with development of limitation of liability in Europe and elsewhere 
which were sanctioned in order  to promote the increase of the number of ships and 
vessels, and to prevent any discouragement to merchants and others from participation 
in the shipping industry. It was a measure to tackle the prejudice of the trade and 
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navigation of the United Kingdom. It is this justification, namely the promotion of the 
trade and shipping industry which provokes a uniform criticism and mostly cited 
arguments, that it is time to abandon such privilege since there are other means of 
supporting the shipping industry.  
The rationale for limitation of liability in this period was to protect the owner from 
unlimited liability for negligence of those particular servants who were beyond his 
physical control, but with the developments in every aspect of shipping, nowadays 
such justification is not relevant.  However, as it has been mentioned, there is still 
criticism about the development of limitation of liability in the United State, which 
was modelled on the English Act of 1734. 
Although OPA 1990 is considered to be an example for unlimited liability, in 
particular, the Californian State legislation, it was stated that OPA has achieved the 
objective of an increased compensation rate for the victims, but it seems that the 
litigation process is expensive, timely and complex. On the other hand whether OPA 
will change the behaviour of the shipping industry in term of safety management or 
reduce maritime disasters is questionable, and remain to be seen. It is notable that if 
the shipping and insurance industries are able to cope with OPA 1990, then that may 
make the position of the antagonists’ proposal of abandoning limitation of liability 
stronger. Thus, the negative effect of the OPA 1990 on the uniformity of international 
maritime law pertaining to limitation of liability is a valid argument. 
Further it was submitted that the 1957 Convention was criticised for many reasons 
and those factors were catalyst in the development of the LLMC 1976. The most 
important factors for such changes includes considerable litigation related to 1957 
Convention regime and uncertainty of outcome of the judgments regarding the right to 
limit. It is also submitted that the limitation concept through its certainty provide a 
quick settlement system, which is consider to be a positive point for having limitation 
of liability regime.  
In addition, it is noted that the “privilege of limitation” was converted into a “right to 
limitation” pursuant to changes by Article 4 of the LLMC 1976 Convention. It is also 
remarkable that the wording of Article 4 of the 1976 Convention resembles the mens 
rea requirement in the criminal law. Further, judges had more flexibility under the 
1957 Convention than the current regime.  In addition, the application of International 
 68 
Safety Mechanism was considered, and it is submitted that at least, as far as evidence 
in the limitation of liability litigation is concerned, it will prove to be a positive point, 
as well as possibly changing the behaviour of the shipping industry toward safer and 
quality shipping. 
 Finally, the economic analysis of the law shows that if there are incentives for ship 
owners, then the rate of compliance is greater which will result in cleaner 
environment and quality shipping. Further, such study promotes and encourages 
designed regulation for behavioural change, deterrence and incentive for compliance, 
such as many regulation and conventions drafted by International Maritime 
Organization. Through legal- economic analysis, both regimes of limited and 
unlimited liability is desirable for different subject matters, which will provide 
justification for both liability regimes similar to CLC 1992 and OPA 1990.  
In conclusion, the assessment of any liability regime, in particular, the limited liability 
mechanism, even if considered as an incentive, depends on the result of the purposes 
for which it is created. It is doubtful whether unlimited liability will change the 
behaviour of the shipping industry for compliance and succeed in providing a better 
system. The argumentations and justifications of both camps for retention and 
abolishment of the limitation of liability has been considered, but the main point is 
that the result of any changes for both blocs will alter the players which benefit in the 
process of such transformation. 
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